Systems are increasingly exposed to threats of disruptive events, e.g., failures, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, etc. A proactive approach is needed to protect the business and reduce the potential losses caused by these disruptive events. Business Continuity Management (BCM) is a way to integrate the recovery process within the preventive framework of risk assessment. Such integrated risk management strategy offers great potential benefits. However, the complexity of applying it in practice is such that existing BCM strategies are mainly based on qualitative methods only, which limits the potential added values. To support quantitative BCM, in this paper we define a set of quantitative business continuity metrics. The defined metrics are based on the estimated losses incurred by the disruptive event in the whole business process. For this, the business process is divided into four sequential phases, i.e., protection phase, mitigation phase, emergency phase and recovery phase. For each phase, a specific modeling method is developed and an integrated modeling framework is constructed for the business continuity. Simulation can, then, be used to quantify the business continuity metrics. The developed methods are applied to assess the business continuity of an oil storage tank farm.
integrated model.
23
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present a four-phase conceptual model for 24 business processes. Based on the conceptual model, the definition of the quantitative business continuity metrics 25 are presented in Section III. An integrated modeling framework is developed in Section IV for the modeling 26 and assessment of business continuity. The developed methods are applied in Section V to assess the business 27 continuity of an oil storage tank farm. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI with a discussion on 28 potential future works. remains at its nominal value when the system is under normal operation and drops to a degraded value when 1 the normal operation of the system is disrupted. In practice, an organization is susceptible to various disruptive 2 events, which might jeopardize its business continuity. Commonly encountered disruptive events include 3
• technological disruptions, caused by component or system failures;
4
• natural disruptions, caused by natural disasters, e.g., floods, earthquakes, lightening, etc.;
5
• social disruptions, caused by social movements, e.g., terrorist attacks, strikes, supply chain disruptions, 6 etc.
7
When one or some of these disruptive events occur, the normal operation is disrupted and PPI B drops to a 8 degraded value, as a consequence of the disruptive events. The organization and its stakeholders, then, suffer 9 from losses caused by the business interruption. To reduce such losses, various business continuity measures 10 can be taken to guarantee the continuity of the business process. Generally speaking, those measures can be 11 divided into four categories, i.e.,
12
• protection measures, for defending the system from the disruptive events and preventing them from 13 damaging the system. If protection measures succeed, the business process is not interrupted;
14
• mitigation measures, which are automatically activated when the protection measures fail and initial damage 15 has been caused by the disruptive events. The aim of the mitigation measures is to contain the evolution 16 of the disruptive events at the early stages of development, so that damages can be mitigated;
17
• emergency measures, which happen when the mitigation measures fail to contain the damage, and often 18 require significant human intervention;
19
• recovery measures, which aim at re-establishing normal operation.
20
For example, lightning is a severe threat to oil & gas systems [31] . Often, a lightening protection mast is installed 21 at oil and gas tank farms as a protection measure against the threat of lightning [32] . If the protection mast fails 22 to protect the system, the oil storage tank might catch fire [33] . Mitigation measures, such as the automatic fire 23 extinguishing system, are automatically activated to fight the fire in order to prevent it from spreading to other 24 tanks, causing a domino effect [33] . Emergency measures, e.g., the intervention of a fire brigade, are needed 25 when the mitigation measures fail to stop the propagation of the accident [34] . Then, recovery measures, e.g., 26 the repair and restoration of the affected tanks, are carried out to recover operation and minimize the losses 27 caused by the business interruption. how much system performance is degraded from the damage caused by the disruptive event. Recovery measures 36 influence how quickly the system can recover to normal operation. 
III. LOSS-BASED BUSINESS CONTINUITY METRICS

1
In this section, we define a set of quantitative business continuity metrics to cover the whole business 2 continuity process. Evidently, business (performance) continuity is inversely related to the losses caused by 3 the disruptive event, i.e., a higher value of business continuity indicates less losses caused by the business 4 interruption. Therefore, we define the business continuity metrics as a function of the losses due to the disruptive 5 event.
6
Two kinds of losses are considered in this paper, i.e., direct losses and indirect losses. Direct losses, denoted 7 by L D , are those caused directly by the disruptive event. For example, when a lightning strike hits an oil 8 storage tank, L D might include the structural damage of the tank, the loss of the oil contained in the tank 9 due to leakages in the damaged structure, and other possible losses that occur right after the lightning strikes.
10
Indirect losses, denoted by L I , are those incurred during the recovery process. In the previous example of the 11 storage tank, the tank needs to be shutdown or at least operated at degraded performances during the recovery 12 process, which causes revenue losses to the organization. Besides, L I also includes the costs of replacing or 13 restoring the affected tank, e.g., the costs of spare parts, maintenance personnel, etc.
14 Let L i denote the losses caused by the ith disruptive event. The loss L i includes direct loss and indirect loss.
15
Therefore, we have
where L D,i and L I,i are the direct loss and indirect loss caused by the ith disruptive event, respectively. The 17 indirect loss, L I,i , measures the lost profits due to the degraded performance and the potential system downtime 18 in the recovery process. To further quantify L I,i , it is assumed that
where k is the indirect loss caused by the disruptive event per unit time per unit PPI B ; t recv,i is the time that is 1 taken to recover the business process to its nominal performance; PPI B,N is the nominal PPI B for the business 2 process and PPI B,i is the performance indicator of the business process after the damage of the ith disruptive 3 event.
4
We are interested in the business continuity over a time interval [0, T ] (e.g., the life of the system). Suppose 5 that the number of disruptive events that occur in [0, T ] is n(T ). From (1), the loss due to the disruptive events
where L D,i and L I,i are the direct loss and indirect loss of the ith disruptive event, respectively, and L I,i 8 is calculated using (2). It should be noted that due to various uncertainties, the n(T ), L D,i and L I,i are 9 random variables; therefore, L T is also a random variable. Based on (3), we can define quantitative metrics for 10 business continuity.
11
Definition 1. We define the Business Continuity Value (BCV) as
where L tol is the maximum loss that an organization can withstand.
13
It is easy to verify that that BCV ∈ (−∞, 1] and a high value of BCV indicates high business continuity. The 
18
The relationship between BCV and PPI B is that, the BCV is defined based on the expected losses L T , which by the value of PPI B , according to (2). The physical meaning of (2) is to measure the revenue losses due to 21 the potential partial operation period of the system (i.e., operating at a reduced capacity) after the strike of the 22 disruptive events.
23
The BCV defined in (4) is conceptually similar to a widely applied resilience metric, the resilience triangle:
24
if we let k = 1 and t recv,i = 1 in (2), the L T in (4) derived based on the probability distribution of BCV. EBCV is calculated as the expected value of BCV.
32
SDBCV is calculated as the standard deviation of BCV, to measure the variability in the BCV values.
The probability that disruptive events causes business interruption in the considered time interval, denoted 1 by P BI , is the third numerical metrics defined in this paper:
It measures the likelihood of business interruption caused by the disruptive events.
3
When the losses caused by the disruptive events are beyond tolerable, the organization might have trouble 4 recovering: this situation is called Business Failure (BF), in this paper. The probability of business failure,
5
denoted by P BF , is calculated by
The value of P BF measures the capability that an organization cannot recover from potential disruptive events.
7
It should be noted that the four numerical metrics can be explained in financial terms using monetary values 8 (e.g., in U.S. dollars). For example, suppose that the organization objective of the analysis can withstand financial 9 losses up to $100, 000 (i.e., L T = $100, 000) and EBCV = 0.8, SDBCV = 0.01, P BI = 0.8, P BF = 0.1:
10
• EBCV = 0.8 indicates that the organization can accept to suffer on average a financial loss of 100, 000 ×
11
(1 − 0.8) = $20, 000;
12
• SDBCV measures the variations in the acceptable expected losses: a larger SDBCV indicates that the 13 expected losses are subject to large variations and vice versa;
14
• P BI = 0.8 indicates that with probability 0.8, the organization could suffer financial losses;
15
• P BF = 0.1 indicates that with probability 0.1, the organization could suffer financial losses larger than
16
$100, 000.
17
IV. AN INTEGRATED MODELING FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS CONTINUITY ASSESSMENT
18
In this section, we first present an integrated modeling framework for business continuity (Section IV-A).
19
Then, a simulation-based method is developed to calculate the defined business continuity metrics (Section 20 IV-B).
21
A. The integrated modeling framework
22
To model the business process, we make the following assumptions to capture its characteristics:
The occurrence of disruptive events follows a homogeneous Poisson process with a rate parameter λ DE .
24
2) The consequences of the disruptive event are classified into n discrete states with increasing degree of 3) The times it takes to recover the business process from state C DE,i to C DE,i−1 , denoted by t recv,i , i = 28 1, 2, · · · , n are independent and identically distributed random variables, with probability density func-29 tions f recv,i (t).
30
4) The reliability of the business continuity measures does not change with time.
31
As shown in Figure 1 , the business process comprises of the protection, mitigation, emergency and recovery the modeling of the emergency phase involves a sequence of activities taken by the emergency response team.
22
As a result of the event tree modeling, the consequences of the disruptive event,
and the probabilities of these consequences, denoted by P C0 , P C1 , · · · , P Cn , can be obtained. times of the gate, as shown in Figure 3 [37]. The probability of the domino effect, can, then, be calculated based on analytical or simulation procedures,
18
as summarized in [37] , which also determines the occurrence probability of the intermediate events associated
19
with emergency measures in the event tree model. of the event tree, which can also be yielded by the event tree analysis. According to Assumption 3, the recovery 2 process is characterized by the probability density distribution of the recovery times, which should be estimated 3 based on historical data or expert judgements.
4
Based on the developed models, the evolution of the PPI B in the entire business process, which covers the 5 protection, mitigation, emergency and recovery phases, can be simulated using Monte Carlo simulations [43] .
6
The business continuity metrics can, then, be estimated by further considering the losses incurred in the business 7 process, as described in (1) Poisson process with rate parameter λ DE . Therefore, t disp is generated by simulating the next arrival time the recovery time t recv can be generated from the probability density function f recv,i (t). When a recovery event 17 occurs, the P P I B,cur is updated first, based on the effectiveness of the recovery process. Then, the indirect 18 loss, L I , is updated by considering the time spent in the previous degraded state.
19
The algorithm in Figure 4 is repeated N times and the empirical distribution of the BCV can be estimated 20 based on these samples using (4). The numerical business continuity metrics defined in Section III can, then,
21
be calculated from the empirical distribution of the BCV. In this section, we consider the crude oil storage tank farm originally reported in [34] as a case study, and 25 apply the developed modeling framework to assess its business continuity. The tank farm is located in Tianjin,
26
China, and its layout is illustrated in Figure 5 [34]. Ten External Floating Roof (EFR) storage tanks make up 27 the tank farm, which is used to store crude oil. Each tank is 21.8 (m) in height and has a diameter of 80 (m).
28
The main material of the floating roof and tank wall is #16 steel, whose thicknesses are 5 (mm) and 35 mm,
29
respectively. The capacity of a single tank is 1 × 10 5 (m 3 ) and therefore, the tank farm has a total capacity
To remain operational at full capacity, all of the ten tanks must be in working state.
31
Therefore, the number of working tanks is used as the PPI B of the tank farm.
32
The business continuity assessment starts from the identification of potential disruptive events. An event tree model is constructed in Figure 7 for a single tank throughout the protection, mitigation and 9 emergency phases. In Figure 7 , the initial event, a lightning stricking the tank farm, is assumed to follow a
10
Poisson process with rate λ L ; P pro is the probability that the protection mast successfully prevents the lightning 11 from damaging the tank; P DD is the probability that the arrived lightning strike results in a direct damage to the 12 tank; P F V is the probability that flammable vapors exist in the rim area. According to [34] , flammable vapors 13 are always present in the rim area of EFR tanks; therefore, we assume P F V = 1; P AF ES is the probability that 14 the automatic rim seal fire extinguishing system operates normally so that a rim-seal fire could be extinguished 15 promptly; P F F S is the probability that the fixed foam system operates normally so that a full surface fire could be extinguished promptly; P F B is the probability that the fire brigade arrives in time and works correctly so 1 that the fires can be controlled before domino effects develop. 
In (7), N G is the arrival rate of the lightning strikes per year per kilometer (km −2 · y −1 ); A D is the equivalent 5 receiving area (m 2 ) for the storage tank. Suppose R and H denote the radius and height of the tank, respectively.
6
Then A D is calculated by
The value of C D , which represents the location factor of the building, can be determined from Table II [45] . Therefore, we have A D = 3.49 × 10 4 . Since the tanks are obviously higher than the surrounding objects, we 
where n is the number of working tanks. Therefore, we have λ S = 9.842 × 10 −3 (y −1 ). 3) Determination of P DD : Direct damage of the tank is caused by the heat generated by the lightning strikes, 4 which primarily depends on the peak current of the captured lightning strike. The generated heat would lead to 5 the formation of hemispherical grooves on the walls or roofs of the tank [34] . If the amount of the generated 6 heat is large enough, the radius of the grooves might be greater than the thickness of the walls or roofs, and 7 leads to the perforation of them. Reference [48] points out that to cause direct perforation, the peak current 8 of the captured lightning strike needs to exceed a threshold value, denoted by I th , which is dependent on the 9 thickness of the tank wall or roof, as shown in Table III . Reference [34] proposes an empirical relationship to calculate the probability that the peak current I peak is 11 greater than I,
In this case study, the thickness of the tank wall is 35 (mm) and the thickness of the roof is 5 (mm). Since the 13 thickness of the tank wall is much higher than that of the roof, we only consider the possibility of the perforation 14 of the roof in this paper. From Table III , I th = 158 (kA); substituting it into (9), we have P DD = 1.6 × 10 −2
15
for the tanks in this case study. to the nearby tanks, the fire needs to be put off within T th = 17 (min).
25
An ESD similar to that in [37] is constructed to describe the sequential behavior of the fire brigade, as shown in Figure 8 . According to the survey in [50], the T i , i = 1, 2, · · · , 5 follow lognormal distributions with the parameters summarized in Table IV , where e and m are parameters of the lognormal distribution, whose probability density function is
Then, the value of P F B is calculated by Monte Carlo simulations, i.e., P F B = 0.693. Table V . The consequences C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C 6 , listed in Table V , can be further grouped into three categories, based on 5 the number of affected storage tanks, as shown in Table VI . When the consequence of the lightning strike is 6 C 6 , there is no storage tank affected by the lightning. When the consequence of the lightning strike is C 1 , C 3 7 or C 4 , there are local damages to the hit tank, without spreading to domino effects: therefore, only one tank 
C 2 Domino effect caused by pool fire Fire spread to the neighboring tanks;
Damages are caused to the tank where the fire started and the four neighboring tanks.
C 3 Rim seal fire extinguished A rim seal fire has occurred and extinguished; Local damage is caused to the tank where the incident occurs.
Full surface fire extinguished A full surface fire has occurred and extinguished; Local damage is caused to the tank where the incident occurs.
C 5 Domino effect caused by full surface fire Fire spread to the neighboring tanks;
Normal functioning No damages are caused to any tank.
is affected. When the consequence of the lightning strike is C 2 or C 5 , the fire caused by the lightning spreads 1 to the nearby tanks and domino effects are caused. In this paper, we assume that if domino effects occur, the 2 number of affected tanks is 5. 
3
Pool fire extinguished; rim seal fire extinguished; full surface fire extinguished 1 S 3 C 2 , C 5 Domino effects caused by pool fire; domino effects caused by full surface fire 5
The number of available tanks is used as the PPI B of the business process for the tank farm. When a tank is 4 hit by the lightning or affected by domino effects, it becomes unavailable until it is repaired. Recovery measures 5 should be performed to replace or restore the affected tank, so that it could return to normal operations. The 6 behavior of the PPI B is described in the state diagram in Figure 9 , where the states represent the number 7 of available tanks. As shown in Table VI , the PPI B might degrade in two manners, i.e., either by S 2 or 8 by S 3 . Since the arrival of lightning strikes follows a homogeneous Poisson process with a rate λ L , the 9 transition rates associated with S 2 and S 3 are determined by the decomposition of Poisson processes [39], i.e., According to Table V and VI, P S2 = P 1 + P 3 + P 4 , P S3 = P 2 + P 5 . In this paper,
11
for brevity, we just assume that only one tank can be repaired at a time and the recovery time t recv follows 12 a LogNormal distribution with a mean value 30 (d) and a standard deviation 5 (d). Since the transition rates The losses an organization might suffer from the disruptive events include the direct losses and the indirect 5 losses. In this case study, the direct losses depend on the number of affected tanks, denoted by n:
where k L D is the average direct damage per tank caused by lightning and domino effect. In this case study,
7
for illustrative purposes, we assume that k L D = 6 (in arbitrary units) per tank.
8
The indirect losses are calculated using (2), where the number of available tanks is used as the PPI B of the 
E. Results and discussions
17
The results of the simulation are summarized in Figure 10 , which displays the empirical distribution of BCV.
18
BCV values are manly distributed in four regions (Region 1 -Region 4 in Figure 10 ):
19
• Most of the samples have a BCV equal to 1 (Region 1 in Figure 10 ), which indicates that no business 20 interruption has been caused by the lightning (either no lightning strike hits the tank farm or the consequence 21 of the lightning strike has been blocked by the protection measures so that no damage is caused).
22
• A closer examination at the samples that fall in Region 2 in Figure 10 reveals that for these samples, the lightning strike hits a tank and makes it catch fire. The fire is controlled promptly so that no domino effect results, which corresponds to state S 2 in Table VI . Moreover, the recovery process is smooth: no lightning The scatter of this region is due to the variability of the recovery time.
1
• A similar analysis is done to the samples in Region 3. Most of the samples in this region suffer from domino effects (the state S 3 in Table VI) . Therefore, the affected number of the storage tanks is 5. Moreover, the recovery process is smooth: no lightning strike hits the fire tank during the recovery process. Hence, the mean value of BCV in this region is
The scatter of this region is again due to the variability of the recovery time. spread BCV values than in the previous cases.
5
The four numerical business continuity metrics can be calculated based on the simulation results: EBCV = 0.9783, SDBCV = 0.2203, P BI = 1.78 × 10 −2 , P BF = 4.10 × 10 −3 .
For this case study, given the related assumptions and numerical values used for the parameters, we can conclude 6 with high confidence that the tank farm would demonstrate high business continuity under the threat of lightning. of the modeling framework.
7
In this paper, we only considered the system subject to a single disruptive event. In the future, the framework 8 should be extended to multiple disruptive events. Moreover, we rely on event trees to describe the protection, 
